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Social Expectations towards the Welfare State. 
The case of Poland — opportunities and risks
Abstract
The objective of the article is to demonstrate the complexity of issues related to the numerous 
social expectations made of the welfare state and their bilateral and diverse nature, referring 
to theory and statistical data. Referring to selected solutions already in place and/or currently 
being implemented within social policy in Poland, in particular, it addresses the opportunities 
for fulfilling these expectations and the dangers of (not) doing so. Realisation of social 
expectations brings with it not only specific gains, but also risks when it is not accompanied 
by active citizenship, free-market mechanisms are weakened, or attachment to social transfers 
becomes stronger. Furthermore, the selectiveness and ideological nature of awarding them 
contribute to social divisions and tensions and to distortion of the values that are crucial 
in social policy. Social security requires the commitment of major resources, long-term 
and socially determined actions, and usually also their continuation by political opponents. 
Negotiated and consistently implemented schemes increase social trust and can be evaluated, 
and their predictability increases citizens’ sense of control and security.
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Introduction
There are many reasons for reflecting on citizens’ expectations towards the state, 
particularly since today they become stronger the more they are fulfilled. In my view, 
this is especially interesting in terms of the ongoing debate on the populist turn in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the increasing importance of citizen-centric 
approaches (e.g. Kende & Krekó, 2020; Suteu, 2019; Stanley, 2017; Vesnic-Alujevic et al., 
2019). Perceived as a source of delegation and exercising of power, social expectations 
have become an ideological construct in whose production the state apparatus plays the 
dominant role (cf. Raciborski, 2010). Polish politicians’ willingness to invoke it is shown 
by government announcements and records of parliamentary sessions, in which legislative 
initiatives are presented as a reaction to the expectations of society (e.g. Wypowiedzi 
na posiedzeniach Sejmu, 2019). An extremely popular and invariably effective rhetorical 
device among politicians of various persuasions is the assertion that anybody who 
opposes initiatives with such motivations also opposes the will of the people. According 
to politicians’ statements, therefore, the state responds to social expectations. But who 
is it that expresses these expectations — after all, society is not a uniform mass — and 
what exactly are they?
In order to demonstrate the complexity of the issues in question, I will begin by 
pointing to selected social expectations of the welfare state, referring to theories and to 
public opinion polls. What “social” means will be expressed by statistical data. I decided on 
this approach firstly because, while it is impossible to cover the full range of expectations, 
one can use examples to show their diversity. Secondly, this makes it possible to highlight 
the fact that (statistically) widely expressed expectations are always accompanied by 
less common yet equally significant ones. Thirdly, these diverse social expectations are 
often contradictory — and consequently, satisfying some may restrict the possibility of 
satisfying others. Next, based on examples, I will discuss the chances of fulfilling the 
social expectations made of the welfare state, as well as the associated dangers. Satisfying 
these expectations brings with it not only specific benefits, but also risks if this is not 
accompanied by active citizenship, free-market mechanisms are weakened and attachment 
to social transfers is reinforced. Moreover, the selectiveness and ideological nature of the 
criteria of accepting citizens’ demands usually contribute to social divisions and tensions, 
thereby distorting key values in social policy such as subsidiarity, justice and solidarity.
While focusing on social expectations as a rhetorical weapon and contribution to 
political actions, I would like to stress that the article concerns not expectations in general, 
but those towards the state. Moreover, the social expectations invoked by politicians do 
not necessarily arise on a bottom-up basis, and their source is not always the real needs 
of particularly social groups and the struggles of their everyday lives. Social expectations 
in this or any other sense can be disregarded, diminished and overinterpreted, kindled, 
artificially created and sustained as a result of political rather than social interests. Where 
social expectations play a role in the political game, this of course makes it possible 
to satisfy them, but can also cause secondary problems to arise. Taking the highlighted 
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issues into consideration, the article can provide essential input into the interdisciplinary 
field of comparative studies of welfare state attitudes (e.g. Andreß & Heien, 2001; Baute 
et al., 2019; Rosma et al., 2013), in which there is no shortage of references to social 
expectations as a significant variable (e.g. Jaime-Castillo & Marques-Perales, 2014). 
Applying my reflections to the actual situation, I propose my own typology and analysis 
of social expectations as an overlooked or exposed aspect of proposed solutions and 
implemented reforms within Polish social policy.
Bilaterality and the differentiated nature of expectations 
— a theoretical approach
Every deliberate action is based on assumptions concerning how the world operates, 
what can be expected and what should be done as a result (cf. Olson et al., 1996, p. 211). 
Behind these assumptions lie expectations which, along with knowledge and moods, 
determine people’s behaviours and interpretation of their surroundings. People have 
expectations of themselves and others, and in forming them they make plans for the 
future, for which they have specific hopes (Słownik języka polskiego, 2002, p. 761; Giełda, 
2015, p. 37–38). Expectations therefore constitute a bridge between the past and the 
future, and the actions one might expect from other people or institutions are identified 
on the basis of previous experiences (cf. Hilgard, 1968, p. 981). Expectations in this sense 
have variable meanings, extents and contents. If we extend these general remarks to 
citizens’ expectations of the welfare state, it is important to note that they are bilateral and 
differentiated. I understand bilateral expectations to mean the links between the expecter 
and the entity which is to fulfil the expectations. On the one hand, people expect specific 
actions from the state, intervention or the lack thereof, and they also do not always trust 
it: whether their interests will be taken into account, whether they will be appropriately 
satisfied and whether the actions undertaken will continue. On the other hand, the 
officials (politicians) responsible for the action of the state have their expectations towards 
citizens. For instance, they expect joint responsibility and cooperation (such as consent to 
new tax burdens or loss of previous privileges), occasional non-interference, and loyalty. 
They sometimes do not act disinterestedly, and ration trust, awarding it mainly to their 
supporters.
Social expectations are also differentiated on the basis of: [1] the presumption of their 
fulfilment; [2] the unjustified but unvarying hope that they will be fulfilled; [3] the assumed 
way in which they will be fulfilled. On this basis I identify three types of expectations. The 
first entail the existence of justified presumptions concerning the likelihood of particular 
events occurring in the future. I propose to call these anticipatory expectations. These 
are based on credibility and trust in the people and/or institutions towards which we 
have expectations. Representatives of governing parties therefore do not only act on 
behalf of citizens, but also employ persuasive messages to convince them that election 
promises are being fulfilled. The second type of expectations is related to human hopes. 
This means that expectations are also made when those who are assumed to be able 
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to fulfil them in fact do not do so. I refer to this type of expectation as wishful. These 
are formed in conditions of great uncertainty. Neither current nor past experiences give 
certainty, and the existence of these expectations is justified by having important as well 
as unfulfilled needs. An example might be social expectations concerning improvement 
of the operation of the health service in Poland, unchanged and unsatisfied for many 
years. The third type of expectations concern anticipated forms of action. Inspired by the 
classification of Janusz Reykowski (1974, p. 205), I call these functional, as they encompass 
specific and desired forms of activity. They are not about “any” changes in the education 
system or health service, but about “concrete” solutions. What counts is not what people 
expect (e.g. shorter queues to specialist doctors), but the way in which these expectations 
are fulfilled (e.g. without additional financial burdens) — which significantly limits the 
available range of solutions and makes it difficult to achieve the anticipated results.
The multitude and ambiguity of social expectations 
— a statistical perspective
The rules of the welfare state specify the range of services on offer to citizens, 
formulated by political scientists and others in the form of theoretical premises as well 
as politicians and officials within party programmes and solutions implemented within 
the framework of national social policies (e.g. Roosma et. al., 2013; The Law and Justice 
Party’s Programme…, 2019). The ways in which we learn about citizens’ expectations of 
the welfare state, meanwhile, include individual and joint petitions, street protests and 
demonstrations, strikes, and media statements. Such information also comes from NGO 
reports and public opinion polls. It is to this final source that I refer in the subsequent 
part of this article. The question, however, is what these expectations include. In the 
subject literature, the range of actions of the welfare state is not clearly specified. They 
encapsulate initiatives aimed at people susceptible to various threats and facing poverty, 
as well as those addressed to society as a whole, usually in the form of financial provisions 
for the purposes of insurance and consumption smoothing in the life cycle, the medical 
system and access to school education. The scope of the welfare state’s activity therefore 
includes non-social areas that are part of so-called social investments, such as education, 
healthcare (Bambra, 2007) and housing (Golinowska, 2018). State social activities are 
thus not only about social protection, but often divided into three categories: education, 
healthcare and social provisions, including such areas as expenditure on pro-family policy 
(Sawulski, 2017).
Given the broad range of expectations that citizens form towards the welfare 
state, I use statistical data to refer to examples, focusing on two more general related 
circumstances. Firstly, social expectations are often marked by internal contradiction. The 
actions expected by citizens (e.g. reduction of the retirement age) sometimes clash with 
their anticipated results (e.g. high retirement pensions). According to the 2018 OECD 
study Risks that Matter, concerning perception of social and economic risk, Poles’ biggest 
concern is uncertainty over retirement and lack of financial security for their old age 
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(74%). The premises of the reform implemented in 20132 foresaw that an improvement 
in the economic situation of future pensioners was potentially to be brought by bringing 
retirement age for women and men into line and raising it to 67 — a change which had 
some support, but was introduced against the expectations of the majority of citizens. 
Some 79% of respondents opposed raising the retirement age for men, and 86% for 
women (CBOS, 2012). The proposed changes meant loss of privileges, delayed rewards 
and uncertainty over their receipt in the future. In the context of the social expectations 
I analysed, this final issue — uncertainty regarding future pension benefits caused, for 
example, by breaking of the social contract without a referendum — seems particularly 
important. The same year, the government decided to introduce another unpopular 
change in the pensions system involving transferring the money accumulated by citizens 
in Open Pension Funds (OPF) to the Social Insurance Institution. This happened despite 
criticisms from some economists and citizens made before the change was implemented. 
A survey showed that some 49% people who were insured in OPFs held a negative 
view of the government proposal, while just 11% assessed it positively (CBOS, 2013). 
As the authors of a statement on the research note, “[…] in keeping with the spirit of 
the 1999 pensions reform, people insured in OPFs treat the contributions transferred 
to the funds as their own savings for old age, which the state should not have access to. 
[…] The implemented and planned changes in the pensions system are accompanied by 
increased fears concerning not only the size of future pensions but also the guarantee 
that they will be paid out in future” (CBOS, 2013, p. 18). This kind of action, irrespective 
of the intentions of those implementing the project — increases mistrust in the state 
and its institutions as well as entities in the pensions market: “Poles do not believe that 
the government’s actions are guided by the good of future pensioners” (CBOS, 2013, 
pp. 17–18).
In accordance with their promises from the 2015 election campaign and based on 
public dissatisfaction, in 2017 the government succeeded in restoring the age at which 
pension benefits were payable to its lower level, differentiated for men and women. 
Opinion polls in 2016 showed that most Poles (84%) supported the decision to restore the 
previous retirement ages, yet only 4% of them approved the associated significant drop 
in retirement payments compared to earnings (CBOS, 2016). The change was therefore 
introduced despite failing to alleviate the fears of the majority of citizens concerning 
the lack of financial security for old age (these concerns were also not allayed by the 
implementation of Employee Capital Plans3), while disregarding the legal guarantee of 
2 Act of 11 May 2012 on changes to the law on retirement and pensions from the Social Security 
Fund and certain other laws (Dz. U. [Journal of Laws] 2012, item 637), entered force on 1 January 
2013.
3 A study by the Nationale Nederlanden insurance firm entitled Pracownicze Plany Kapitałowe 
oczami Polaków (Views of Employee Capital Plans among Poles) shows that the biggest advan-
tage of such schemes was seen as the opportunity to pull out and receive a pay-out at any point. 
The company’s analysts mentioned three reasons for their negative reception: distrust towards the 
government, the memory of the Open Pension Funds (OPF) scheme and delayed rewards. Fears 
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equal treatment of citizens in the social insurance system4 as well as the government’s 
knowledge that “one in five Poles do not know what social insurance contributions are. 
A quarter cannot name them […] and 40% of young people view themselves as ignorant” 
(Zielona Linia, 2018). Not directly, but contrary to the available knowledge on the subject 
of social ignorance as to how pensions are calculated and what affects their level (Wiedza 
i postawy…, 2016), the decision was made to reduce the retirement age, and this took 
place in accordance with public expectations — as government websites show (Kancelaria 
Sejmu, 2017; Wybór Polaków, 2017).
Secondly, expectations may be characterised by external contradiction. This means 
that actions meant to address social expectations often take place against the will and 
despite the overt protests of certain groups and to the acclaim of others. This becomes 
particularly problematic when the protesters — theoretically and in practice — should 
implement the proposed solutions, as was the case with teachers in 2019 and sustained 
announcements that they would continue their strike over education reforms. The 
justification for these actions, antagonising the community and various social groups, 
turned out to be the expectations of the majority, and not the numerous opinions of 
expert teachers, as indicated in a statement issued by the Ministry of National Education: 
“The implemented education reform is a response to the expectation of the majority of 
Poles” (Komunikat MEN, 2019). But it remains an open question what type of changes 
this majority wanted in fact. It is worth recalling that after the education reform was 
introduced, between 1998 and 2007, the opinions on Polish schools improved, with positive 
evaluations being considerably more common (51%) than negative ones (36%) (CBOS, 
2007). Later too, before education reform came into force in 2019, the majority of Poles 
gave a positive verdict on the level of education in all types of school. Although around 
a half of respondents deemed the reform to be necessary (52%), just 34% thought that the 
current education system functioned better than prior to its introduction (CBOS, 2018a). 
In summary, it seems justified to say that in general, proclamations from the state — in the 
form of politicians and government experts — regarding fulfilment of social expectations 
only partially take such expectations into account. Diverse expectations (anticipatory, 
wishful and functional) of the same and different groups of citizens are pitted against 
each other, along with various expectations among governing parties.
that the state would take the money from the plans, as with OPF, was the main reason for aversion 
towards the programme, given by 61% of respondents. Source: http://fundusz-lokalny.pl/opinie-
polakow-o-ppk/ (access: 12 December 2019)
4 Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the 
principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security (79/7/EEC). Article 4. 
The principle of equal treatment means that there shall be no discrimination whatsoever on ground 
of sex. Source: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/1979/7/oj (access: 2 September 2019).
Similarly, the Constitution of the Republic of Poland states that nobody may be discriminated 
against for any reason (art. 32 para. 2), and women and men have equal rights in family, political, 
social and economic life (art. 33).
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Chances of satisfying social expectations
From the range of diverse chances for the welfare state to satisfy social expectations, 
I will identify two opportunities, which we can call circumstantial and civic. Circumstantial 
opportunities are created when various circumstances increasing the probability of fulfilment 
of expectations coincide — both good economic results for the state and a favourable political 
situation. The latter generally serves only part of society — people on the so-called political 
wave, the electorate of the governing party, their potential allies, or troublemakers and 
opponents with strong social support whom political calculation makes it hard to ignore. 
Selective reactivity of the government to social expectations and the associated social privileges 
are practices known in Poland from the past, discussed by Janusz Czapiński and Marek Góra 
(2016), who cite the social unrest of the 1980s which resulted in the introduction of privileges 
for selected professional groups. In this way, the authorities hoped to “buy” themselves peace 
from the agitators (and in democratic systems such tactics can “buy” voters) in exchange for 
benefits which, in the case of pensions, need not be paid (placing the burden on the state 
budget) immediately. The resultant situation was that various types of privileges permitting 
earlier economic deactivation became widely available in Poland, although such solutions 
affect the sense of social justice and solidarity. Indeed, it is worth noting that more than 86% 
of respondents stated that there should be a uniform retirement system. This was also the 
preferred solution among the majority of people covered by a separate system, for example 
68% of farmers (Czapiński & Góra, 2016, p. 24) — demonstrating that the statistical majority 
is not always sufficient for the ruling party to ensure fulfilment of social expectations.
From the perspective of the overall population, civic opportunities seem to be 
more desirable. These include: 1) social activism — moving from the welfare state to 
welfare society (Rymsza, 2014); 2) strengthening the third sector — support for public 
social services; 3) education and a flexible approach to fulfilling expectations; 4) social 
consolidation and the power of collective pressure. While also paying attention to the 
significance of social activism and the development of the third sector, I shall begin by 
citing OECD data from 2018 showing that in Polish social policy, it tends to be financial 
provisions that are expanded, rather than services. It is a challenge to take social 
expectations into account while improving the quality of health services and education, 
which are the basis of so-called social investments. Early education, healthcare and social 
integration are the condition of development of human capital (Golinowska, 2018, p. 144), 
and an opportunity for meeting new challenges and dealing with the social risks that result 
from changing work patterns, technological development, transformations to the family 
model and an ageing population. Non-governmental organisations have major potential in 
this field. By working on a partner-based and participatory basis, they are more effective 
in providing help to the weakest people and efficient in representing their interests. 
Independent NGOs enjoy greater trust than public institutions — 54%, as opposed to 
just 25% for the government (Trust…, 2018).
In discussing the third of the chances, I refer to ambiguous, and even contradictory 
expectations concerning the question of the financial security in retirement. Education 
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could help citizens to formulate relevant expectations not only on the basis of concerns, 
but also the benefits accruing, for example, from extending their economic activity 
(Czapiński & Góra, 2016, p. 30). What seems most effective is a combination of education 
with instruments permitting flexibility in retirement age: from the right to an earlier 
retirement based on the type of work and taking into account the number of years worked, 
to initiatives to support the activity of people fit to work and interested in continuing 
to do so in late adulthood (e.g. requalification, flexible working hours, adaptation of 
workplaces). Owing to a lack of applied, comprehensible and widely available knowledge 
and failure to provide the support needed by diverse groups of citizens, people are often 
left with little choice. Without this support, even if legislation allows for such choices, they 
are barely more than empty legal regulations.
Observing the diversity and scale of social protests over the years, we can euphemistically 
state that the state does not represent and realise all interests of citizens in a satisfactory 
way. Bearing in mind the authorities’ politically motivated and selective reactivity to 
social expectations, strikes and social protests therefore provide an opportunity for 
fulfilling them. Civic opposition and the associated demands are a way of aspiring to 
a realisation of social expectations that stirs conflict but is an effective method intrinsic to 
a democratic system. By organising around the issues that are important to their specific 
community, publicising them, lobbying and seeking allies, citizens can provoke media, 
political and politicised debates, which often result in negotiations, public declarations, 
and consequently also legislative changes.
Risks associated with fulfilment of social expectations
Just as a favourable economic and political situation can make satisfying social 
expectations easier, an unfavourable situation can hinder it. They also become harder 
to realise as a result of legislative haste and lack of debate on issues of importance for 
various groups of citizens. Furthermore, stimulating and fulfilling social expectations 
does not only serve people, but can also cause a number of problems when it is not 
accompanied by active citizenship, free-market mechanisms are weakened and attachment 
to social transfers is weakened. For example, this might lead to: [1] weakening of family 
and decommodification; [2] uncertainty and a sense of losing benefits; [3] dwindling 
expectations of the state; [4] social divisions and a sense of injustice.
Research conducted between the 1980s and 2018 shows that Poles have had relatively 
stable expectations regarding guarantees of social security. Citizens expect the state to 
play a protective role towards them (Raciborski, 2010; OECD, 2018). In recent years 
in Poland, these expectations have been further stimulated as large sections of society 
have received direct financial transfers. I will point to three factors which mean that the 
availability of these transfers does not necessarily translate to increased social security. 
Firstly, in the case of non-working families, unconditional monetary transfers significantly 
weaken their economic function, with which the obligation to provide material security 
to their members is traditionally linked. This function entails the family’s responsibility 
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for suitable education in the value and ethos of work — the source of personal and 
social prosperity. At the same time, the dominance of direct financial transfers over the 
development of social services means that the family is their main producer, disregarding 
the diverse level of knowledge and competence of its members. As a result, although 
expenditure on family policy is increasing, institutions offering professional social services, 
which have always been allies of the family, are weakened. Without the necessary funding, 
these institutions become poorer, and their availability and the quality of the services 
they offer therefore also suffer (Golinowska, 2018, p. 15). This generates real dangers 
when difficult situations requiring specialist knowledge appear. Moreover, this kind 
of social policy tends to go hand in hand with low employment of women, which can 
sometimes lead to the phenomenon of feminisation of poverty (cf. Tarkowska, 2002). 
Secondly, broad redistribution of income from the working to the non-working population 
in the form of unconditional access to social provisions makes people independent from 
the free market, payment of contributions and working, which in turn consistently leads 
to decommodification (Golinowska, 2018, p. 136). Social and economic deactivation 
constitutes a genuine threat to such values as social responsibility and solidarity, which 
might be expressed through payment of taxes. Thirdly, unconditional and direct funding 
of support to economically deactivated people, in cases where competences to work are 
lacking or become obsolete, can result in justifiable concerns about losing these benefits 
in the future. By offering short-term comfort, they result in “other-directedness” and an 
uncertain future. As the economic and political situation are uncertain, the continuity of 
social programmes is also in doubt. This is reflected in public opinion polls. For example, 
more than half of respondents are worried that the current or next government will not 
find money to continue the “Family 500 plus” benefits programme5 (CBOS, 2016). It 
is therefore worth underlining that the mere threat that these benefits could be taken 
away by political opponents is becoming a strong and effective electoral slogan for the 
government, which awards these benefits as well as proclaiming guarantees that they 
will be continued (see: The Law and Justice Party’s Programme: “Welfare State: the Polish 
Model”, 2019). This may in turn create the specific category of risk that is loss — in some 
part — of civil liberties (e.g. economic independence, voting freedoms). Dependence 
on state transfers combined with a lack of competences essential for independent 
acquisition of the money needed to support oneself and one’s family can make citizens 
“hostages” of the authorities, which regulate and/or hand out various benefits as they see 
fit (cf. Poznaniak, 1998; Titkow, 2014). The fact is that such state actions are not usually 
perceived as a form of oppression by the citizens collecting the benefits and are not an 
obvious mechanism of it. In the context of these findings, however, it is justifiable to argue 
(although this is open to interpretation) that the “[…] state and society have many ways 
5 This scheme has been in operation since 1 April 2016 (with subsequent amendments) in the 
form of a monthly financial transfer (child-support benefit) amounting to 500 zloty, for which at 
present each child up to the age of 18 qualifies, irrespective of the family/guardians’ income (source: 
https://www.gov.pl/web/rodzina/rodzina-500-plus (access: 25.08.2020)).
Marcjanna Nóżka44
in which the private world of the mind can be colonised and ultimately controlled by the 
values of the oppressor” (Harrison & Boyd, 2003, p. 100).
With the concerns and risks mentioned above comes a deficit in trust of politicians, 
confirmed by research conducted in 2018 as part of the Democracy Perception Index 
project. Some 63% of Poles said that they did not count in politics, and did not feel they 
had any influence on the country’s affairs, while 68% thought that the government did 
not act in their interests (Democracy…, 2018). A culture of distrust prevails as a result 
of the belief that the system – the corrupt officials, the mendacious politicians – cannot 
be trusted (Szlendak, 2015, p. 337). These circumstances affect social expectations. Trust 
is connected to credibility, understood as meaning “fulfilling expectations or satisfying 
obligations towards those who have placed their trust in us” (Sztompka, 2007, p. 99). 
The trust and credibility of the state determines, on the one hand, citizens’ belief in the 
chance of fulfilment of their expectations, and on the other, their willingness to support 
initiatives to realise them. A consequence of lack of trust is therefore lack of expectations 
towards the state (CBOS, 2018). The people who want state welfare to be less than it 
is at present are those who do not believe that paying higher taxes, for which the state 
offers its services, brings positive results. In 2016, 90% of those surveyed said that the 
money available in the budget is often spent irrationally, and that taxes are too high in 
comparison to what the state provides to citizens (87%) (CBOS, 2016a). More than half of 
respondents (54%) in 2018 felt detached from social programmes and thought they would 
have difficulties accessing benefits if they needed them (OECD, 2018). In a situation in 
which social expectations are additionally fulfilled on the basis of ideological and loyalty-
based criteria, and public programmes are treated as political tools, the sense of injustice 
increases. This is a source of social divisions and aversions, towards both the government 
and fellow citizens benefiting from state provisions. This can lead to a crisis of social 
responsibility, avoidance of obligations to the state, and thus also to other citizens, yet 
the anticipated effective social welfare system cannot be built on mistrust, social divisions, 
low taxes and a lack of rudimentary social security (cf. Golinowska, 2018, pp. 136–137).
Conclusion
To summarise the findings made to date, it makes sense to cite the view of Brian 
M. Barry, according to whom creating welfare should take into account both what people 
want and what is good for them (cf. Barry, 1965). While this argument seems sensible, it is 
insufficient to transcend the problem of bilaterality and differentiated social expectations, 
as well as the political biases involved in meeting them. Overcoming these would certainly 
provide (increase) an opportunity for accomplishing differentiated social expectations, 
assuming that the response of the welfare state to social expectations entails discerning 
new challenges and the associated risks when the old instruments are no longer effective 
and it is necessary to develop new ones and to coordinate numerous entities operating 
in various social sectors and at various levels of decision making (cf. Golinowska, 2018, 
pp. 24–26). Social security requires the commitment of major resources, long-term and 
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socially determined actions, and usually also their continuation by political opponents. It is 
also aided by publicly available knowledge on the sources of public financial benefits and 
the negative consequences of increasing them. Without social and political agreement on 
the long-term expediency of social transfers, a foundation of the welfare state is destabilised 
— social solidarity and the sense of justice. Negotiated and consistently implemented 
schemes certainly increase social trust and can be evaluated, and their predictability 
increases citizens’ sense of control and security. However, what is favourable for citizens 
is not necessarily favourable from the point of view of political goals. An example might be 
changes in the pensions and education systems, amended over the years within different 
parliamentary terms without public negotiations yet accompanied by claims of fulfilment 
of social (electoral) expectations. These changes radically disturbed the continuity of 
previous reforms and had tangible social costs — a lack of trust and justified uncertainty 
among citizens regarding whether the changes currently taking place will continue in 
future. 
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